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Abstract
The recent ‘correlation breakdown’ in the modeling of credit default swaps,
in which model correlations had to exceed 100% in order to reproduce market
prices of supersenior tranches, is analyzed and argued to be a fundamental
market inconsistency rather than an inadequacy of the specific model. As
a consequence, markets under such conditions are exposed to the possibility
of arbitrage. The general construction of arbitrage portfolios under specific
conditions is presented.
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1 Introduction
The high volatility in the market of credit derivatives, precipitated by the recent
mortgage crisis, has elevated the question of proper modeling and valuation of such
products into one of the most pressing and interesting problems in finance. Its
relevance spans the spectrum from hedging to speculation in the credit swap market.
The prevailing model for analyzing and valuing such products is the Gaussian
copula model, otherwise known as “correlation model”, loosely based upon Mer-
ton’s theory. In this model, the problem of producing or simulating the defaults of
a pool of entities (“names”) under given individual default probabilities pi over a
time horizon and corresponding default correlations ρ˜ij is addressed by subjugat-
ing the default events to the evolution of underlying normal correlated variables,
representing the “assets” of each name. The default statistics produced this way
translate into a loss distribution for the portfolio containing these names, which, in
turn, allows the valuation of tranched credit default swaps referring to this pool.
Variants of this model are used by both market participants and rating agencies.
The market upheaval related to precipitous changes in the values of such default
swaps has exposed this process as basically flawed. The reasons could be manifold
but they can be lumped into the following generic causes:
• The model is unrealistic, inadequate or insufficiently sophisticated
• The market has overreacted and created valuations inconsistent with the model
as well as reality
• A combination of the above
The third possibility, being the most generic, is the most likely. Still, even a partial
assignment of blame to the market must be fully substantiated. Eventually it is
market prices that matter in finance and any model is only as successful as its
ability to describe the market.
A common instance in which markets can be assumed to misbehave is when mar-
ket prices are way out of whack with fundamentals. We have many such examples
in early and recent history, but the problem is that it is hard to demonstrate the
discrepancy in present time; it is only a posteriori that such deviations from reality
become documented and (usually, painfully) obvious.
The situation in which markets misbehave in a presently detectable way is when
they develop internal inconsistencies, ranging from the plain and obvious to the
subtle and convoluted. Such inconsistencies (or inefficiencies) should be demonstra-
ble in an unambiguous way through the analysis and comparison of market data
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themselves. They also should lead to self-correcting effects in terms of opportunities
for arbitrage. Transaction costs, liquidity and other causes may frustrate the actual
exploitation of these opportunities, but still the identification of such situations as
a diagnostic of market imbalance is a very interesting issue.
In this paper we focus on the recent ‘correlation breakdown’ phenomenon of early
2008, in which model correlations above 100% were invoked to explain market prices,
as an obvious case study of possible inconsistencies. Omitting many details, we shall
show that, indeed, this situation points to market detuning and presents identifiable
arbitrage openings. Our analysis by no means absolves the present correlation model
-in fact, we consider it imperative that the model be refined or further developed.
It does, however, shed some light on the workings of the market and identifies one
aspect in which the adoption of a better model may not be the main issue.
As an outline of the results, the main points demonstrated in this paper are:
•We recall the existence of upper limits for the values of the elements of the default
correlation matrix ρ˜ij for given default probabilities
• We establish the uniqueness of the default process (joint default probabilities)
when the above limit is saturated
• We demonstrate that the Gaussian copula model (and any other copula model)
produces the above unique process when asset correlations take their maximum
value of 100%
•We point out that situations where asset correlations higher than 100% are needed
to reproduce market prices of tranches reveal fundamental inconsistencies in market
prices
• We construct appropriate arbitrage portfolios that exploit the above inconsisten-
cies by locking in riskless profits
2 Defaults under maximal correlation conditions
Consider a set of names with individual default probabilities at the end of a specific
time horizon pi. Their state of default is represented by a set of default indicators
Ii assuming the value 1 if name i has defaulted and 0 otherwise. The default
correlations ρ˜ij are defined as
ρ˜ij =
P (Ii = 1, Ij = 1)− pipj√
piqipjqj
(1)
where qi ≡ 1− pi is the probability of non-default of name i.
2
The ρ˜ij essentially determine the joint default probabilities of any two names,
P (Ii, Ij). Indeed, there are four such probabilities, corresponding to the four possible
default scenarios of names i and j; they must reproduce ρ˜ij , pi and pj and sum to
one; that is,
P (1, 1)− pipj = ρ˜ij√piqipjqj
P (1, 0) + P (1, 1) = pi
P (0, 1) + P (1, 1) = pj
P (0, 0) + P (0, 1) + P (1, 0) + P (1, 1) = 1 (2)
These are enough relations to fully determine the P (Ii, Ij) as
P (0, 0) = qiqj + ρ˜ij
√
piqipjqj
P (0, 1) = qipj − ρ˜ij√piqipjqj
P (1, 0) = piqj − ρ˜ij√piqipjqj
P (1, 1) = pipj + ρ˜ij
√
piqipjqj (3)
The above probabilities must be non-negative. (They must also not exceed l,
but this is guaranteed by non-negativity and the fact that they add to 1.) This
implies constraints for ρ˜ij . The first and last relations above imply a negative lower
bound. Since correlations are generally assumed positive, this is not a useful or
restrictive constraint. The middle two relations, however, together with P (0, 1) ≥ 0
and P (1, 0) ≥ 0, imply
ρ˜ij ≤ min
(√
piqj
qipj
,
√
qipj
piqj
)
(4)
This is a consistency condition that each element of any default (binary) correlation
matrix must satisfy.
It is worth pointing out that the above condition is distinct from the condition of
positivity of the eigenvalues of ρ˜ij . There are positive definite correlation matrices
violating the above condition; conversely, there are non-positive definite matrices
satisfying the above condition. Consequently, satisfaction of the above condition
does not guarantee that ρ˜ij is a possible default correlation matrix, meaning that
well-defined joint default probabilities leading to the above correlations may not
exist.
Interestingly, however, when the above conditions are saturated (that is, they
hold as equalities) for all matrix elements of ρ˜ij, the corresponding joint default
probabilities do exist and are unique. To demonstrate the existence, assume that
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we order the names in terms of increasing default probability; that is,
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pN (5)
The default correlation matrix that saturates the condition (4) reads
ρ˜ij =
√
piqj
qipj
, i < j (6)
Then the joint default probabilities that realize the above correlations are of a ‘lad-
der’ type:
P (I1 = . . . = In = 0, In+1 = . . . = IN = 1) = pn+1 − pn (7)
all the rest being zero. (To make the above formula valid for n = 0 and n = N we
define p0 = 0 and pN+1 = 1.) In other words, names default in a hierarchical order,
each name defaulting only if all names with higher default probability also default.
As a simple explicit example, consider a portfolio with 5 names of default prob-
abilities
p1 = 0.6% , p2 = p3 = 1% , p4 = 1.2% , p5 = 4% (8)
Then the only default scenarios with non-zero probability are:
a) No names default, with probability 1− p5 = 96%
b) Only name 5 defaults, with probability p5 − p4 = 3.8%
c) Only names 4 and 5, default, with probability p4 − p3 = 0.2%
d) Only names 2,3,4 and 5 default, with probability p2 − p1 = 0.4%
e) All names default, with probability p1 = 0.6%
Note that names 2 and 3 always default in tandem, since p2 − p3 = 0, and if any
name defaults the whole set of names riskier than this name also default.
The default process defined in (7) reproduces the correct single-name default
probabilities P (In = 1) = pn and default correlations (6). These facts, and the fact
that it is the unique process that reproduces the above default probabilities and
correlations, are easy to prove and we present the derivations in Appendix A.
The lesson derived from this section is that for any given set of default prob-
abilities there is an absolute maximum in the default correlations and a unique
default pattern that realizes this maximum. Any model that can reproduce the
above pattern with appropriate imput parameters has achieved the maximum pos-
sible correlations.
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3 Maximally correlated copula models
The model most widely used to produce default events with given {pi, ρ˜ij} is the
Gaussian copula model. The basic steps of a simulation based on this model can be
outlined as
• Assign to each name a continuous variable Xi (“asset”) whose value at the end of
the time period of interest is normally distributed
• Assume that a name will default if the value of its asset variable at the end of the
period has fallen below a specific minimal value ci (“threshold”)
• Render the asset variables correlated with a given correlation matrix ρij
• Adjust the parameters ci and ρij such that the above model reproduce the desired
results.
Market models adjust the above parameters so that they reproduce the market
prices of a given set of credit products. Rating agencies, on the other hand, use
the default data pi and ρ˜ij as the fundamental inputs. Determining the Gaussian
inputs {ci, ρij} in terms of the binomial inputs {pi, ρ˜ij} is achieved using numerical
or approximate analytic formulae for the Gaussian probabilities P (Xi < ci) = pi
and P (Xi < ci, Xj < cj) = pipj + ρ˜ij
√
piqipjqj .
The “correlation model” often used in the market in order to define base correla-
tions is a further simplified version of the Gaussian copula model with the additional
assumption of homogeneity: all names have equal notional amounts, the same de-
fault probability (deduced from their average spread) and ‘flat’ asset correlations,
that is, ρij = ρ = constant (a ‘single-factor’ model). This reduces the number of
parameters and compromises the model, making it a less realistic description of the
default process. In what follows we shall use the more general (non-homogeneous)
Gaussian copula model. As we shall argue, the appearance of oversized (>100%)
correlations in the homogeneous model would also imply correlation breakdown in
the more general non-homogeneous model and thus also the emergence of arbitrage
situations.
The asset correlation matrix ρij, apart from being positive definite, is unre-
stricted. The maximally correlated model is, then, achieved by choosing all asset
correlations equal to 100%, that is, ρij = 1. Under such conditions, the Gaus-
sian copula model reproduces the maximal correlation default model of the previous
section, with default correlations as in (6) and joint default probabilities as in (7).
To prove this fact it is enough to notice that fully (100%) correlated Gaussian
variables are essentially the same variable; that is, all asset variables can be set to a
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unique Gaussian variable Z: Xi = Z. For names ordered according to their default
probabilities, as in (5), the thresholds are similarly ordered:
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cN (9)
For a value of Z such that cn < Z < cn+1, the names n + 1, . . . , N default (since
Xi = Z < ci for such names) while the names 1, . . . n do not default (Xi = Z > ci).
This reproduces the ‘ladder’ default pattern of the previous section. Further, since
P (cn < Z < cn+1) = P (Z < cn+1)− P (Z < cn) = pn+1 − pn (10)
these probabilities are as in (7). So we recover the exact default probabilities of the
(unique) maximally correlated default model.
It should be clear that any copula model using continuous, correlated variables
will also reproduce the above maximally correlated default model upon choosing
asset correlations 100%. Indeed, any set of fully correlated continuous variables will
collapse into a unique variable Z. Since in the above analysis we never used the
specific form of the Gaussian cumulative distribution P (Z < c), it goes through for
any copula model.†
The lesson derived here is that all copula models with the same default proba-
bilities pi will produce identical joint default probabilities for maximally correlated
defaults, and therefore identical results for the loss distribution of the reference port-
folio and tranche pricing, provided that all other assumptions, i.e., recoveries, are
the same. In general, different models may be more or less successful, accurate or
realistic. For market conditions calling for highly (in fact, maximally) correlated de-
faults, nevertheless, they are all identical and produce the unique consistent default
pattern.
4 Market prices and correlation breakdown
In considering the credit default process of a set of names, we may adopt two distinct
poits of view on the nature of the joint default probabilities:
†The above discussion shows that at maximum correlation all simulation models become equiv-
alent and can be realized in the following way: Produce a random number X uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. Then all names with default probability bigger than X default, while all names
with default probability less than X do not. This provides a simple and expedient way to simulate
this system.
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• They represent objectively defined fundamental probabilities that describe the
actual default process. They can be deduced from historical data or by best-estimate
analysis based on current fundamentals.
• They represent market-implied probabilities that reproduce market prices through
risk-neutral valuation. They can be deduced by tuning model parameters to match
the valuation of market-priced entities.
It is the second point of view that is relevant to the present discussion. Implied
probabilities have been used widely in finance: they are, e.g., the ‘Martingale’ prob-
abilities of options pricing under complete and efficient market assumptions. More
importantly, they are the basis for calibrating the “correlation model” that has be-
come the standard in pricing bespoke tranches of credit default swaps. They are the
probabilities that would enter any discussion of price compatibility and arbitrage.
It could be argued that, under this second point of view, implied probabilities
are not ‘true’ probabilities in the mathematical sense and thus may not need to
share all the properties and satisfy all the constraints of probability theory. Indeed,
implied tranche correlations (or even the better-behaved base correlations) of the
correlation model, in order to match market prices are varied with impunity over
detachment points even as they refer to the same pool of names, a fundamentally
inconsistent procedure in the probabilistic sense.
It is important, nevertheless, to realize that implied probabilities do behave as
regular probabilities and that model-independent deviations from regular behavior
signal market pricing inconsistencies and create, in principle, the possibility for
arbitrage trading. This is the topic of the present section.
The strongest signal of such a deviation from regular behavior was the ‘correla-
tion breakdown’ of early 2008, which required a flat asset correlation of more that
100% in the homogeneous copula model to reproduce the market prices of superse-
nior tranches.‡ Note that, for the homogeneous model, asset correlations of 100%
also imply default correlations of 100%.
Correlations of more than 100% in the simulation model cannot exist. To see
what they mean in practice, consider the value of a supersenior tranche obtained
through risk-neutral valuation as the expectation of the value of the tranche at
‡In principle, the model works with base correlations that refer to equity tranches of given
detachmet points. Because of equity-supersenior parity, however, the two are directly related: the
sum of an equity tranche and a supersenior tranche that share the same detachment-attachment
point is the full portfolio, whose value is correlation-blind; therefore the implied correlations of the
two tranches are equal.
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maturity. This is, in general, an increasing function of the default correlations, and
thus also of the (flat) asset correlations. A semi-analytic formula yielding the value
of the tranche as a function of the asset correlation can be established (at least in
the large-pool homogeneous model). If at the maximum asset correlation of 100%
we still obtain a value below the market price of the tranche, we can drive the
correlation higher than 100%, beyond the range of validity of the formula, in order
to reach the market price. This is the correlation breakdown effect.
What the above means is that, even for the maximum asset correlation of 100%,
the Gaussian copula model fails to produce a tranche price as high as its market
value. If this is the case for the homogeneous model, it will also happen for the
more general non-homogeneous model. Indeed, it can be seen that, for 100% asset
correlations, the homogeneous model will give a more widely spread portfolio loss
distribution than the non-homogeneous model, increasing the expected loss of su-
persenior tranches and thus the fair value of their credit default swap. If this is still
below the market value, so will be the one calculated from the non-homogeneous
model.
The discrepancy could still be attributed to a failure of the specific model. We
know, however, from the analysis of the previous section that this is not the case:
the Gaussian model (as well as any other model) produces the unique default process
with the highest possible default correlations under given individual name default
rates. If even this model underestimates the value of the tranche, this means that
the market’s pricing of the tranche is unreasonably high and inconsistent with the
underlying name default rates.
The individual name default rates are ‘priced’ by the market in terms of credit
default swaps for the corresponding individual names. The existence of an inde-
pendent market product (the supersenior tranche) with a valuation fundamentally
inconsistent with the prices of its underlying components should signal the existence
of arbitrage opportunities. Indeed, this is the case as will be demonstrated in the
next section.
5 The arbitrage portfolio
In considering the question of arbitrage we shall make the usual assumptions of
friction-free trading: enough liquidity to go long or short any amount in all available
products with negligible bid-ask spread and transaction costs.
We shall work with a pool of N defaultable names. Credit default swaps (CDS)
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are available for each name as well as tranches of a reference portfolio containing a
(percent) notional amount Ni of each name. To reduce the issue to its bare bones,
we assume a single-period situation in which all premiums are paid up-front and any
losses are incurred at the end. We shall also assume fixed (deterministic) recovery
rates, different for each name. This is a simplifying assumption, in line with most
standard model simulations; stochastic, correlated recoveries clearly would require
a different analysis. Finally, we assume zero risk-free interest rates (a harmless
assumption allowing us to dispense with present-value conversion factors).
The fair present value of a credit product C is its expected value at maturity.
Denoting with {Ii} the collective state of default of the names at maturity, repre-
sented by their default indices, P ({Ii}) the probability of this default scenario and
V (C{Ii}) the value of the credit product at maturity for the given default scenario,
the risk-neutral fair present value of the product is
V (C) =
∑
{Ii=0,1}
P ({Ii}) V (C{Ii}) (11)
For a credit default swap, V (C{Ii}) is the payment that the seller of protection must
make at maturity to cover losses due to the default scenario {Ii}, and thus V (C)
is the fair premium that the seller of protection must receive up-front. P ({Ii}) are
market-implied probabilities that reproduce the market prices V (C) for all available
CDSs.
Under the above assumptions, the market value of a CDS on $1 notional of name
i, denoted Ci, assuming a deterministic recovery ri and loss given default ℓi = 1−ri,
is
V (Ci) = ℓi pi (12)
In this sense the individual CDS Ci ‘prices’ the implied probability of default pi.
Similarly, the market value of a CDS for a supersenior tranche with attachment
point A, denoted S[A], is
V (S[A]) =
∑
{Ii=0,1}
P ({Ii})
[
N∑
i=1
NiℓiIi −A
]
+
(13)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0) is defined as x for x > 0 and 0 otherwise. (Note that a
supersenior CDS with attachment point higher than
∑
iNiℓi is never hit and thus
has vanishing fair value. This is a known problem of fixed recovery rates.)
We are now ready to present an arbitrage scenario. Assume the names are
arranged in order of increasing default probability, as in previous sections, and that
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the attachment point A of the supersenior tranche lies within the range:
A =
N∑
i=n+1
Niℓi + ǫNnℓn , 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 (14)
Then without further elaboration we propose the arbitrage portfolio:
1. We sell protection on the supersenior tranche (go long on one unit of S[A])
2. We buy protection on Ni units of name i, for all names i = 1, . . . n− 1 (go short
on Ni units of Ci)
3. We buy protection on (1 − ǫ)Nn units of name n (go short on (1 − ǫ)Nn unit of
Cn)
We claim that:
• The portfolio Parb will always have a non-negative value at maturity, no
matter what the actual default scenario
• Under market conditions of ‘correlation breakdown’, the portfolio Parb will have a
negative initial value
The above two statements imply that, under correlation breakdown, the portfolio
Parb will always increase in value irrespective of the actual defaults. Therefore, it
will afford a riskless profit, realizing an arbitrage opportunity in the market. The
proof of the above statements is given in Appendix B.
We should stress that the above portfolio is not fluctuation-free: its value at
maturity will vary according to the realized default scenario. In this sense it is
different than the arbitrage portfolios in Cox-Ross or Black-Sholes options pricing
theory, which assume a deterministic value at maturity. Nonetheless, it is a clear
case of arbitrage as it represents a ‘can’t-lose’ gamble.
The structure of the arbitrage portfolio is remarkably simple: we buy protection
for specific amounts of the n least risky names and sell protection for the super-
senior tranche starting at A. This is somewhat counterintuitive, as the tendency
would be to buy protection on the riskiest assets in the reference portfolio. Under
correlation breakdown conditions the market overvalues the protection of the super-
senior tranche. As a result, the premium collected from this tranche is enough to
cover the premiums paid for the protection of individual names, while at maturity
no net losses can possibly be incurred. Appendix B makes these statements exact.
The dressed-down situation that we considered above has shed many of the
features of realistic traded credit default swaps. As it refers to a single-period swap
with up-front premium payments and end-of-period default payments, it does not
deal with issues of default timing and corresponding reduction of received premiums,
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resulting in a simpler valuation. (This is what makes formulae (11) and (12) valid.)
Also, the conditions for liquidity and small bid-ask spreads may not be fully met in
available credit products.
The assumption of deterministic recovery, although standard in most models,
does not reflect the reality of defaults. Incorporating stochastic, correlated recoveries
would require a different analysis.§ To produce a true arbitrage portfolio in that
case we would need to cover the possibility that actual recoveries are small. This is
achieved by putting all ℓi = 1 in formula (14). This will increase the value of n and
will result in buying protection on a larger number of the least risky assets 1, . . . , n,
thus making the portfolio more expensive. The market price for the supersenior
tranche that would guarantee arbitrage would need to exceed the premiums paid for
this expanded set of single-name CDSs.
In general, the above price would be higher than the model price for 100% asset
correlations and fixed recovery assumptions. The model that reproduces this price
with 100% correlations must assume 0% recoveries for names n, . . . , N (recoveries of
the least risky assets 1, . . . , n−1 need not be lowered, as they have no impact on the
fact that the arbitrage portfolio suffers no net losses at maturity.) Since reported
model correlations exceeding 100% assumed, in general, fixed nonzero recoveries,
the existence of an arbitrage portfolio with mathematically zero probability of loss
in this more general situation is unclear. The above analysis, nevertheless, serves
as an indication that market prices during the recent correlation breakdown have
moved beyond reasonable bounds, at least for senior tranches with short maturity.
6 Conclusions
We have identified a situation in which the market has overreacted to credit events
and appears to have priced some supersenior CDS tranches in a fundamentally in-
consistent way. Regardless of whether the resulting arbitrage opportunities were
actually realized and contributed to the normalization of the market, the fact re-
mains that market data cannot always be taken at face value when pricing credit
derivatives or other financial products.
The above stresses the importance of fundamental analysis, modeling and risk
management. A good model that consistently takes into account fundamental prin-
ciples and properly incorporates the underlying market forces, rather than trying to
§Stochastic, uncorrelated defaults would have only a marginal impact as the central-limit the-
orem would wash out their stochastic nature for a large number of defaults.
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slavishly mimic and match market data, is badly needed. (A “first-principles” rather
than “phenomenological” model, in physics lingo.) Market participants should ex-
ercise proper discipline and operate competent and independent risk management
teams, otherwise risking to create and fall into their own “negative vacuum” bubbles
(another physics allusion). Finally, rating agencies should return to their mission
and be more proactive and original, thus reinforcing their credibility and offering
valuable market checks and balances. In this context, independent valuation com-
panies with strong quantitative, analytical and modeling teams play an increasingly
important role and fill a crucial market void.
Achnowledgements: We would like to thank Joseph Pimbley for a critical reading of
the manuscript and for many insightful comments and remarks that helped make
this a better paper.
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APPENDIX A
The condition ρ˜ij =
√
piqj/qipj for any two names i and j (with pi ≤ pj) implies
that P (Ii = 1, Ij = 0) = 0. This two-name marginal probability is expressed as
P (Ii = 1, Ij = 0) =
∑
{Ik=0,1}
P (I1, . . . Ii−1, 1, Ii+1, . . . , Ij−1, 0, Ij+1, . . . IN) (15)
The above sum of non-negative terms vanishes only if all individual terms are zero.
We conclude that all probabilities P (I1, . . . , IN) with even a single pair i < j de-
faulting in the ‘wrong’ order are zero. The only possible nonzero probabilities are
of the form
P(n) = P (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1) , n = 0, . . . , N (16)
with the first n names not defaulting and the remaining N − n names defaulting.
This proves the ‘ladder’ (hierarchical) pattern of defaults at maximal correlations.
On the other hand the single-name default probabilities are expressed as
pi =
∑
{Ik=0,1}
P (I1, . . . Ii−1, 1, Ii+1, . . . , IN) =
i−1∑
n=0
P(n) (17)
This recursion relation, under the initial condition p1 = P(0), has the unique solution
P(n) = pn+1 − pn (18)
as in (7), proving the uniqueness of the process. Further, from the above form of
probabilities we have
P (Ii = 1, Ij = 1) =
i−1∑
n=0
P(n) = pi , i < j (19)
which gives ρ˜ij =
√
piqj/qipj as expected.
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APPENDIX B
We shall first show that the portfolio Parb will always have a non-negative value
at maturity.
If any of the first n−1 names default the portfolio suffers no loss: we shall receive
a payment equal to Niℓi for each Ci in Parb, while the subordination of S[A] will
decrease by the same amount, so S[A] will suffer a loss of at most this same amount,
if any at all. Therefore, defaults of these names are harmless or even beneficial for
the portfolio. We need concentrate only on the defaults of the remaining N − n+ 1
names.
Out of all default scenarios, the most potentially damaging for portfolio Parb are
the ones in which either the last N − n names have defaulted or the last N − n+ 1
names have defaulted. In the first case the reference portfolio has suffered a loss
L =
N∑
i=n+1
Niℓi < A (20)
and therefore the tranche with attachment point A is not hit. We neither receive
nor make any payments, for a net value of zero.
In the second case the reference portfolio has suffered a loss
L =
N∑
i=n
Niℓi =
N∑
i=n+1
Ni + ǫNnℓn + (1− ǫ)Nnℓn = A+ (1− ǫ)Nnℓn (21)
The tranche with attachment A has been hit by an amount (1 − ǫ)Nnℓn and S[A]
has incurred this amount as a loss. On the other hand, the (1 − ǫ)Nn units of Cn
in the portfolio receive a payment of (1− ǫ)Nnℓn due to the default of name n. The
portfolio breaks even, again for a net value of zero.
Overall, we see that in any default scenario the portfolio will either make a profit
or at least break even. A profit will be made if some of the first n names default
without all the remaining ones defaulting.
We shall now show that the initial value of the portfolio is negative if correlation
breakdown occurs.
The value of the individual CDSs included in Parb depends only on pi and is
independent of correlations. The value of the supesenior tranche S[A], on the other
hand, increases with increasing correlation. Therefore as correlations increase the
value of the portfolio Parb drops.
For the limiting consistent case of 100% asset correlations it is easy to calculate
the value of Parb. As explained in this paper, in that limit the default pattern is
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unique and the only default scenarios with nonzero probability are the ones where
names default hierarchically, riskiest (last) ones first. If fewer than the last N−n+1
names default the portfolio Parb incurs no losses and receives no payments. If exactly
N − n+ 1 names default the portfolio again breaks even, as explained before. If all
N−n+1 riskiest names plus a number of the remaining ones default the supersenior
tranche incurs extra losses, which are exactly balanced by the protection payments
received from the single-name CDSs included in Parb. Overall, we see that the
portfolio breaks even in each of the scenarios that have nonzero probability. We
conclude that the present value of the portfolio for maximal consistent correlations
is zero.
If the market prices supersenior tranches higher than the fair price for 100%
asset correlations we have the correlation breakdown situation. In that case the
single-name CDS part of Parb has the same value but the value of S[A] is higher,
and thus the value of Parb is lower. We have therefore proved that under correlation
breakdown market conditions the portfolio Parb has negative present value.
We should note that it is possible to show rigorously the negative present value
of Parb without reference to the fact that it is a decreasing function of correlations.
We found it preferable, however, to use the familiar fact of increasing supersenior
value with increasing correlations to present a shorter and perhaps more intuitive
derivation of the negative present value property of Parb.
The two properties of Parb proven in this appendix establish its arbitrage property
of securing riskless profits.
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